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 Abstract: As emerging technologies continue to shape 
the landscape of criminal opportunities, disruptive and 
destructive threats from state and non-state actors in the 
cyber domain challenge the ability of nations to respond to 
and defend their citizens and infrastructures. Cyberspace has 
been recognized as a distinct national security policy matter 
since 1998, and national security experts have since 
monitored the global balance of cyber power and trends in 
cyberattack vectors. However, the discourse surrounding 
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national security with regard to the cyber domain has not 
routinely and explicitly defined the role of urban and rural 
local law enforcement agencies or examined these 
institutions’ ability to address a broad range of cyber threats. 
As such, this paper first examines an emerging technology, 
the Tor Network, that employs anonymizing software and 
facilitates attack-based, processual, and economic cyber 
threats. The law enforcement model in the U.S. is then 
explicated, detailing challenges related to fragmentation that 
hamper the ability of some local police departments to 
adequately respond to these threats. This paper concludes 
with proposals for strengthening the cyber capabilities and 
situational awareness of local police departments 
nationwide, emphasizing the need to consider the role of 
local police in future national cybersecurity strategies. 
The very technologies that empower us to create and to 
build also empower those who would disrupt and destroy. – 
Pres. Barack Obama, 2009 
I. INTRODUCTION
Emerging technologies continue to shape the landscape of 
criminal opportunities within the digital ecosystem and challenge 
traditional criminological understandings of victim-offender 
interactions. The pervasiveness of threats in the digital medium both 
from state and non-state actors also challenge nations’ preparedness 
to respond to and defend against disruptive and destructive threats. 
Historically, the U.S. has taken an offensive stance in the cyber 
domain and has comparatively lacked in its defensive capabilities, 
leaving the country “vulnerable in this wired world,” particularly due 
to the substantial dependence and reliance on the cyber domain for 
infrastructural and governmental services (DoD 2015, 1; Valeriano 
and Maness 2012). Further, the U.S. has been identified as the main 
target nation “that dissident groups, terrorist, and rogue states wish to 
damage” (Valeriano and Maness 2012, 145). Thus, the federal 
government, together with the U.S. military and intelligence 
communities, have identified cyberspace as a distinct national security 
policy area since 1998 and have subsequently developed numerous 
national cyber strategies, assessments of existing policies and 
procedures, risk assessments, and planned future actions (e.g., DoD 
2005, 16; DoD 2015, 2; OMB 2018, 3; Lin 2012; White House 1998, 
6).  
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 National security experts have explicated the scope of potential 
cyberattacks, the development of cyber power and influence in this 
domain, and national cyber-based mobilization techniques, (e.g., Betz 
and Stevens 2011, 13; DoD 2015, 2-3; Kuehl 2009, 48; Lin 2012; 
Rattray 2009, 253), which explicitly require action from the federal 
government and implicitly require coordination with and support 
from local and state agencies. However, the discourse surrounding 
national security with regard to the cyber domain has not routinely 
examined how the complexity of cyber threats are handled by these 
latter agencies. Local police agencies have had a “silent partnership” 
with technology for decades, with increasing reliance and dependence 
on the cyber domain for investigational uses, communication 
purposes, case management, criminal database hosting, and data 
storage (e.g., Couret 1999, 1-3; Sanders, Weston, and Schott 2015, 
713). Yet, as crimes in the digital arena are divorced from traditional 
notions of “place,” law enforcement agencies have had to work within 
the decentralized model of policing to adapt to the changing digital 
environment. These agencies face many challenges however, 
including: fragmentation, lack of resources and training, and aging 
technologies.  
 This paper examines the complexity of the cyber domain in the 
current digital age with regard to the numerous and varied threats in 
cyberspace that are related to, and in many cases, originate from 
emerging technologies, and the challenges faced by law enforcement 
agencies in adapting to this new reality (e.g., Bossler and Holt 2012, 
167; Goodman 1997, 478; Wall 2007, 3). Particular attention is paid to 
local police departments, as fragmentation and other issues highlight 
the differential impact of law enforcement responses to cyber threats. 
This study takes the following course: first, this discussion focuses on 
emerging technologies that employ anonymizing software that 
facilitates attack-based, processual, and economic cyber threats. Next, 
the law enforcement model in the U.S. is explicated, detailing inherent 
challenges within the decentralized policing institution that impact 
cyber-related responses to these threats. This paper concludes with 
proposals for strengthening the cyber capabilities and situational 
awareness for local police departments nationwide. Without a strong 
cyber foundation at the local policing level for both urban and rural 
departments, national cybersecurity strategies implemented by the 
federal government will be inherently weakened and the U.S. will 
continue to trail its rivals in defensive capabilities.  
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II. CYBER THREATS ON AN ANONYMOUS PLATFORM: THE TOR 
NETWORK
Emerging technologies are making it increasingly harder for law 
enforcement agencies to keep pace, as new file systems, operating 
systems, cloud computing capabilities, storage mediums, and Internet 
of Things (IoT) continue to relentlessly evolve. Within the realm of 
emerging technologies are those that have been developed to enhance 
the user’s level of privacy in cyberspace. Internet platforms that utilize 
anonymizing software (i.e., software that obfuscates the user’s 
location and browsing activities) are known colloquially as the 
“darknet.” The Tor Network is arguably the most widely used network 
featuring darknet software, though other such networks exist (e.g., 
i2P, FreeNet). Given its widespread use, this discussion will focus 
specifically on Tor.  
 The Tor Project is a 503(c) nonprofit organization located in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. The concept for Tor was developed in the 
1990s; researchers sought to create a network that would enable 
secure communications between individuals located anywhere in the 
world. The U.S. government (e.g., the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, 
National Science Foundation) and other private organizations (e.g., 
Google) began funding this effort in the mid-2000s (TorProject 
2018a), and in the late 2000s Tor was released to the public, which 
introduced noise into the network. That is, if a private network was 
restricted to a limited number of individuals (e.g., government 
officials) and external intruders breached the network, these intruders 
would know that every user is high value target. Releasing the network 
“into the wild” ensures enhanced anonymity for users, as potential 
attackers would not be able to discern one user from the next.  
 The Tor Network utilizes darknet technology to obfuscate network 
traffic via a series of relay nodes, which ensures Tor users’ IP 
addresses and browsing habits remain anonymous while on the 
network. Further, Tor-specific sites use the “.onion” domain, though 
clearnet sites (i.e., the open Internet) are also accessible from the Tor 
browser. As the browser is free to download from torproject.org, the 
Tor Project promotes this network to family and friends (“people like 
you and your family use Tor to protect themselves, their children, and 
their dignity while using the Internet”), businesses (“to research 
competition”), and activists (“whistleblowers use Tor to safely report 
on corruption”) (TorProject 2018b). At the time of this writing, there 
are approximately 2.5 million daily users on Tor (Tor Metrics 2018) 
and despite the legitimate benefits of the network, these added layers 
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of security and anonymity have attracted more than the Tor Project’s 
target user-base; criminal activities on Tor, particularly with regards 
to drug trafficking, have been well documented by researchers (e.g., 
Christin 2012, 7-9; Dolliver and Kuhns 2016, 322; Dolliver and Love 
2015, 79-84; Soska and Christin 2015, 41-42).  
 A plethora of marketplaces currently exist on Tor that function 
similarly to Ebay and Amazon. Administrators operate large, 
international Tor sites that host vendors from around the world who 
set up virtual “shops” within the sites that offer an abundance of both 
legal and illegal goods and services for sale. Such items include drugs, 
stolen personal data, e-guides, malware, and hackers-for-hire 
(Dolliver and Love 2015, 80-81). Popular such marketplaces operating 
at the time of this writing include Dream Market, Wall Street Market, 
Valhalla, and Point Market. As these major marketplaces often ban 
the sale of weapons, child pornography, and murder-for-hire (for 
instance), vendor-specific websites (i.e., sites hosted by one vendor) 
exist to fulfill this demand. Additional sites on Tor host forums and 
personal websites that contain underground hacking groups and 
terrorist-related materials. To further conceal the existence of these 
sites, Tor is not an indexed network – there is no search engine 
analogous to Google Chrome to comb through the tens of thousands of 
sites on Tor as one would use on the clearnet, though some individuals 
have attempted to create smaller “homemade” search functions on Tor 
(e.g., Grams, Fresh Onions). Moreover, “.onion” URLs are non-
identifiable; they are often a random combination of numbers and 
letters, so it is generally not possible to discern the content of the site 
from the URL alone. These additional anonymizing features present 
challenges not only for law enforcement investigations, but also for 
Tor users seeking to access these sites.  
 This discussion serves to highlight the complexity and extensive 
range of threats within the cyber domain related to the emerging 
technologies specific to the Tor Network. There is no limit to what 
cyber adversaries can target, and these threats can be loosely 
categorized as cyber offensive (or attack-based) threats, cyber-
processual threats, and economic threats. These categories are by no 
means mutually exclusive or exhaustive but serve to provide a useful 
discussion framework.  
A. Cyber Offensive Threats
Cyber offensive (or attack-based) threats are those designed to 
disrupt or inflict (virtual or kinetic) damage to a specific target, which 
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may be a particular server or network, or an individual or groups of 
people. These types of attacks include “plug and play” malware code, 
such as ransomware, mobile phone exploits, remote access trojans 
(RATs), DDoS attacks, and viruses, which are readily available for 
purchase on popular Tor marketplaces (Figure 1).1 These tools can be 
used to breach networks, shut down websites, and extort individuals 
or corporations. Additionally, little technical expertise is needed; 
vendors often offer their services to customize the malware to fit the 
customer’s needs, or simply sell “ready to go” malware code that any 
customer need simply to deploy. Though these attacks may cause 
minor disturbances or data loss when targeting the average person, 
these types of offensive attacks may lead to a significant breach of 
national security should efforts be focused on high priority targets, 
such as under-secured networks for critical infrastructures (e.g., 
power grids, voting machines) or mobile devices used by government 
officials. Further, these various forms of malware are relatively easy to 
purchase and deliver electronically via Tor with little risk of the 
transaction being detected or intercepted by law enforcement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 For security purposes, the specific website names and URLs for the Tor sites discussed in 
this paper are withheld. If you are a researcher or law enforcement official and would like 
to request further information on these sites, please email justification to the author. 
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Figure 1. Available Malware for Purchase on Tor Marketplaces2 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attack-based threats on Tor also include kinetic components, such 
as murder-for-hire sites, which often offer other violent services (e.g., 
beatings, poisoning, or otherwise harming the target individual; 
school bombing services), and sites that sell weapons and weapons-
related items (e.g., machine guns, grenade launchers, ricin, RPGs, 
potassium cyanide, handguns, ammunition, silencers, C4, bomb-
making manuals, large-scale attack planning guides) (Figure 2). These 
items and services are not generally found on common marketplaces, 
with the exception of some poisons. Many major marketplaces on Tor 
hesitate to allow vendors to advertise such weapons and chemicals for 
fear of drawing the attention of law enforcement agencies; thus, sites 
2 Vendor names are redacted.  
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that offer these items are harder to locate and access than others. 
Moreover, as weapons and chemicals are tangible items, vendors take 
additional steps to ensure the contents of their shipments are not 
easily detectable by postal services (Dolliver and Kuhns 2016, 322). 
The potential for significant damage inflicted on an individual or large 
group of people via these items and services is self-evident. 
 
Figure 2. Kinetic Threats and Services Available on Tor Sites  
 
 
 
 
B. Cyber-processual Threats
Cyber-processual threats are those that enable or facilitate 
additional criminal activity, such as counterfeit documents (e.g., 
passports, fiat currency,3 identification), the use of particular 
cryptocurrencies, hacking, and encrypted communications. Members 
of criminal or terrorist organizations (for instance) who seek to travel 
under different aliases can readily locate counterfeit passports, 
driver’s licenses, and ID services (Figure 3), in addition to counterfeit 
fiat currencies from a myriad of countries, on a majority of 
international Tor sites and individual vendor shops. Also, fairly 
abundant are hacking services; hackers may offer their assistance on 
their own Tor site or advertise their products on common 
marketplaces. These products include selling WiFi hacking tools, 
3 “Fiat currency” refers to legal tender whose value is supported by the sovereign 
government that issued it (e.g., U.S. dollar, British pound, Polish złoty).  
2019] DOLLIVER  131
breaching networks to steal intellectual property or plant child 
pornography, and hacking into social media accounts.  
 
Figure 3. Counterfeit U.S. Driver’s Licenses and ID Services on Tor 
Marketplaces4 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The use of cryptocurrencies (i.e., virtual currencies) and encrypted 
communications are certainly not unique to Tor or other platforms 
that utilize darknet software; indeed, the use of Bitcoin is becoming 
increasingly common among the general public as more companies 
and retailers around the world are accepting purchases with this 
currency. There are many more cryptocurrencies than just Bitcoin, 
however; at the time of this writing, there are currently 1,624 different 
cryptocurrencies in existence (CoinMarketCap 2018). Moreover, the 
majority of Tor sites – both large marketplaces and individual vendor 
shops – accept payments only in certain cryptocurrencies, though this 
was not always the case. Bitcoin relies on a public-private key 
cryptography to store and spend money, and cryptographic validation 
of transactions (Böhme, Christin, Edelman, and Moore 2015, 216). No 
centralized authority regulates Bitcoin or other cryptocurrency trades, 
and, therefore, the value of these currencies often fluctuates 
substantially. Each ‘spent’ Bitcoin is logged as a transaction (via 
blockchain technology) and all dealings are recorded via a public 
transaction history (Blockchain 2018); this public ledger identifies the 
wallet address(es) of the originating and receiving parties, the 
transaction amount, and the date and time of the transaction. Since 
4 Vendor name is redacted.  
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there is no regulatory oversight of this virtual currency, the user does 
not need to provide accurate personal information in order to buy or 
complete transactions with Bitcoin; however, the ability for anyone to 
publicly identify and monitor wallets and exact transaction amounts 
has led to the development of other forms of cryptocurrencies 
designed with superior levels of anonymity, such as Monero. Monero 
utilizes anonymizing technologies (e.g., ring signatures5 and 
confidential transactions) to obfuscate the origins, destinations, and 
transaction amounts by (among other methods) splitting each 
transaction into multiple, smaller transactions of varying quantities – 
these smaller, random amounts are recorded onto the public 
blockchain.6 The implementation of ring confidential transactions 
(ringCT) in mid-2017 has made it increasingly difficult for anyone to 
trace the total transaction amount or the wallets and users involved 
(Moser et al. 2018, 149). These features are highly attractive to those 
buying and selling illegal goods and services on Tor, which is 
evidenced by the increasing number of Tor sites accepting Monero 
and other harder-to-trace cryptocurrencies as forms of payment. 
 Further, the Tor Network supports multiple means of encrypted 
communications, which adds additional layers of security and privacy 
for users beyond the Tor browser’s basic darknet features. For 
instance, Tor hosts encrypted messaging services (e.g., Briar, 
Ricochet, Tor Messenger, TorChat, SecureDrop) that work in 
conjunction with mainstream instant messaging protocols (e.g., 
Facebook, Twitter, Jabber). Additionally, Tor hosts a number of 
secure darknet email providers, including ProtonMail, Mail2Tor, 
Torbox, Lelantos, and AnonInBox. Messages sent via these services 
and others specific to Tor marketplaces are often further encrypted 
with PGP (i.e., “pretty good privacy”). While these services protect 
sensitive, non-criminal communications, these services also facilitate 
the planning, intelligence sharing, and coordination of criminal 
enterprises. As these levels of encryption cannot be broken, these 
services ensure that even if law enforcement officers intercepted 
5 “Ring signatures” refers to a practice by which multiple entities (i.e., the actual 
signer/individual and prior transaction outputs) are required to digitally approve or 
otherwise authorize a transaction before it can occur. This helps mask the origin of a 
transaction.  
6 For more information on Monero and fungibility, see https://getmonero.org (last 
accessed February 28, 2019) [https://perma.cc/8H56-NCKX]. 
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messages or emails, the content of the communications could not be 
discerned.  
C. Cyber-based Economic Threats
Cyber-based economic threats are those that financially impact 
individuals, private sector companies, and government institutions, 
such as data breaches involving stolen personal or corporate data, 
corporate espionage, and banking information. Batches of stolen 
personal data are readily available on many major Tor sites, though 
often individuals will host their own carding sites (i.e., sites that traffic 
stolen credit cards, bank account information, and personal data) on 
Tor. This information is often very cheap, with stolen identities (i.e., 
full names, SSNs, date of birth, and addresses) generally selling for 
roughly $1 or less each. On February 4th, 2015, Anthem disclosed that 
hackers had breached its network and exposed an estimated 79 
million medical records (Pierson 2017); one day later, interested 
buyers surfaced on popular Tor marketplaces seeking access to the 
stolen data (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. Stolen Personal Data Available on Tor Sites  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Taken together, these threats have the capacity to impact 
individuals, agencies, businesses, and nation-states from thousands of 
miles away, shielded by the security provided by the Tor Network. The 
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cyber domain in general has challenged traditional criminological 
notions of “space” and “time” as the global community is becoming 
increasingly interconnected via cyberspace (Aas 2007, 104). This has 
created unique criminogenic asymmetries (i.e., “structural 
discrepancies, mismatches, and inequalities”) that have been 
intensified by globalization processes (Appadurai 1996; Passas 1999, 
402). That is, offenders no longer need to be within close geographic 
proximity to their targets, and a single individual has the ability and 
potential power to inflict substantial damage to critical 
infrastructures, breach cyber physical systems, and threaten national 
security (Dolliver and Love 2015, 75).  
III. THE U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT MODEL, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 
LOCAL POLICE, AND FRAGMENTATION
 As previously stated, the federal government (including the 
intelligence and military communities) conducts a range of activities 
“to improve collective cybersecurity and protect U.S. interests” from 
foreign and domestic adversaries operating in the cyber domain (DoD 
2015, 3). These activities include building alliances and partnerships 
abroad, strengthening relations with the private sector, and enhancing 
information sharing and interagency coordination (DoD 2015). The 
last point is of particular interest and is one that has been often 
reiterated in national security strategies during Presidential 
administrations dating to the late 1990s, but yet has not been fully 
explicated beyond mentioning the roles of federal entities (e.g., 
Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense, Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
National Security Agency) (e.g., Cybersecurity Information Sharing 
Act 2015). Information sharing and interagency cooperation related to 
cyber threats in the United States requires the assistance and 
participation of local and state agencies, though little attention has 
been paid to the cyber readiness and capability of these entities to 
investigate and defend against all types of cyber attacks and other 
crimes facilitated by the cyber domain and emerging technologies like 
Tor.  
 Perhaps the lack of consideration of these agencies is due in part 
to the decentralization of the policing institution in the U.S., whereby 
separate sovereign jurisdictions and legal frameworks define federal, 
state, and local law enforcement roles and legal authority. In this 
decentralized system, federal agents serve as investigators; these 
agents do not routinely patrol communities, respond to calls for 
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service (CFS; i.e., 911 calls) or interact with the public in the same way 
that local, municipal police officers do. As such, federal investigations 
often involve strategic intelligence collecting and case building that 
may take years, whereas local police officers utilize intelligence for 
tactical (i.e., more immediate) purposes. This traditional model of law 
enforcement in the U.S. is effective in defining the scope and foci of 
investigations, as each agency is responsible for addressing crimes 
that impact their unique jurisdiction and that are within their legal 
authority (e.g., local police departments do not investigate violations 
of federal law that occur within their municipality, such as bank 
robberies, and federal agencies are given particular jurisdictional 
authority as defined by each specific agency’s mission and statutory 
authorities).  
 Significant cyber threats have historically been discussed in 
relation to nation-state responses, which inherently involve federal 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies. However, as societies 
become increasingly interconnected around the world, the cyber 
domain presents additional opportunities for asymmetric threats to 
impact local communities, in which local agencies serve as first 
responders. More closely examining the local policing structure in the 
U.S. and the challenges related to the cyber-adaptation of these 
agencies underscores the need for further attention and consideration, 
as threats that are not mitigated at the local level may escalate to those 
of national concern. Additionally, cybercrimes that impact local areas 
may be linked to larger, national cyber threats. This is evidenced by 
the number of local police departments that have been infected with 
ransomware, foreign state-actors breaching voting systems in both 
cities and small, rural towns, and state-sponsored network intrusions 
that compromise home and office routers (Hatmaker 2017; FBI 2018; 
Franescani 2016). 
 Historically, policing in the U.S. has been based on the 
“localization” of criminal events; that is, crimes have involved the 
convergence of the suspect(s) and victim(s) in the same geographic 
locale, and “space” and “time” have been closely tied to law 
enforcement jurisdictions. Yet, the digital age has complicated the 
understanding of these concepts for local police departments, 
confounding where “crime scenes” are located and how perpetrators 
victimize their targets (Bossler and Holt 2012, 166-67; Burns et al. 
2004, 478; McQuade 2006, 36-39; Swire 2009, 110-11; Wall 2007, 
32). These factors have presented numerous challenges to the 
traditional policing model, as it has become less-clear which agency is 
responsible for investigating various incidents. For instance, if a 
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person’s wallet was stolen from their vehicle and contained $350, the 
victim would report the theft to the local police and a traditional 
investigation would ensue. However, if the same individual’s online 
banking credentials were stolen, resulting in a loss of $350, the local 
police department would be unlikely to investigate this case even 
though a theft had occurred in their jurisdiction. First, this individual 
is not likely to report the theft to their police department, which 
contributes to the significant “dark figure” of cybercrime (Bidgoli and 
Grossklags 2016, 2; Tcherni-Buezzo et al. 2016, 8). Further, if the 
victim did report the loss to police, an investigation of this kind 
requires some degree of technical proficiency and computer resources 
to track down the offender, who would likely be located in a different 
city, state, or country. Local police departments do not often have the 
capacity to investigate these types of criminal incidents, resulting in 
the theft being uninvestigated and the victim either being reimbursed 
by their financial institution or absorbing the financial loss 
themselves. Should the cyber means by which the perpetrator used to 
steal the banking credentials violate federal law, it remains unlikely 
that a federal agency would investigate the case due to the minimal 
loss incurred. The inability of many police departments to investigate 
simple online theft also highlights the lack of ability to address attack-
based, processual, or economic threats facilitated by the Tor Network. 
As discussed below, many officers remain generally unaware of 
darknet technologies, encrypted communications, and 
cryptocurrencies. 
 Without greater adaptation to cyber threats by local police 
departments, these cases will continue without consequence for 
offenders and may encourage further criminogenic behavior. One 
particular set of challenges that complicates such adaptation involves 
technological fragmentation, which is an inherent element of the 
decentralized model of policing in the U.S. Fragmentation occurs 
because of the sovereign independence between agencies, and refers 
to the differences in operational resources and personnel of each 
agency at the local, state, and federal levels. This in turn differentially 
impacts the capacity for each department to respond to cyber (or 
other) threats within their jurisdictional authority. Fragmentation is 
most acutely evident at the local policing level; there are 
approximately 18,000 local police departments in the U.S. and over 
half of these departments have ten or fewer officers operating in rural 
towns across the country (BJS 2016, 1; Peak 2014, 301). This 
underscores the limited capacity of many police departments ceteris 
paribus. These departments operate on restricted budgets determined 
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by the Mayors of the cities they serve, and each department 
determines how funds are allocated to meet the needs of that 
particular department. Thus, the equipment (e.g., less-than-lethal 
weapons), technology (e.g., computers, servers, networks, databases), 
and personnel (e.g., percentage of cyber-savvy officers and analysts 
per department) vary between agencies.  
 Fragmentation allows local police departments to better serve 
their particular communities – officers in rural beats likely have little 
need (for instance) for less-than-lethal options for crowd and riot 
control, while officers in urban areas may find these technologies 
useful. However, fragmentation can also lead to communication issues 
between agencies, as police departments often use different radio 
frequencies and equipment, and limited budgets for smaller police 
departments often yield outdated technology and vulnerable network 
infrastructure. As such, fragmentation differentially impacts police 
departments across the U.S., as larger departments can more easily 
afford infrastructural upgrades, access to bigger candidate pools and 
thus cyber-capable recruits, and specialize their workforce to adapt to 
the changing environment. Consequently, larger police departments 
in theory have a greater capacity to respond to and investigate a wide 
range of cyber threats and network intrusions facilitated by emerging 
technologies than smaller departments, though recent studies have 
shown that even officers in some large cities had little experience 
handling or responding to basic cybercrime complaints (Bossler and 
Holt 2012, 167; Swire 2009, 116).  
 One significant limitation of technological fragmentation for many 
law enforcement agencies is the capacity to process digital forensic 
evidence seized during active criminal investigations. In the digital 
age, both traditional crimes and cyber-specific threats involve at least 
one device containing digital evidence (e.g., mobile phones, servers, 
laptops, routers, CCTV footage). For instance, at the Joint Electronic 
Crimes Task Force (JECTF; a digital forensic laboratory operated by a 
local law enforcement agency in Alabama), the average number of 
devices per case was roughly 3, while one case in 2016 contained 38 
separate devices that required significant amounts of time to process 
(Dolliver, Collins, and Sams 2017, 129). The types of crimes these 
devices were seized in conjunction with included theft, child 
exploitation, murder, online banking fraud, aggravated assault, cyber 
stalking and harassment, and rape.  
  With only four full-time examiners, the JECTF is the largest 
locally operated digital forensic laboratory in the state. The task force 
serves over 40 local, state, and federal agencies and has a backlog of 
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roughly 2-3 months (128); by comparison, other digital forensic 
laboratories in Alabama had backlogs of approximately 18 to 24 
months or more. Some federal agencies, such as the FBI, have their 
own in-house digital forensic capabilities, but overall, this is an 
extremely specialized field that has a limited presence in law 
enforcement agencies across the country. This is primarily due to the 
significant costs required to house such capabilities. For instance, one 
Cellebrite UFED Touch alone (i.e., hardware to process evidence from 
one mobile phone at a time) costs roughly $10,000 per unit, plus an 
additional $4,000 for each UFED software license and subsequent 
annual renewal (Dolliver, Collins, and Sams, 2017, 132). These are 
costs (in addition to training and hiring qualified personnel) that 
many local police departments cannot easily assume, though agencies 
at all levels of law enforcement are becoming increasingly 
overwhelmed with the need to identify and seize devices that may 
contain digital evidence of criminal activity, recognize virtual currency 
wallets and apps used for encrypted communications, and expediently 
process the digital evidence. As societies continue to become 
interconnected with and increasingly dependent on the cyber domain 
(e.g., IoT), the number of devices that are linked to cybercrimes and 
threats, such as those facilitated by the Tor Network, will continue to 
increase.  
 Moreover, significant gaps in research exist on how fragmentation 
has impacted the ability of law enforcement agencies in the U.S. to 
conduct darknet investigations. Prior studies have largely focused on 
local-level police perceptions and awareness of general “computer 
crimes,” “e-commerce,” or “online property crime,” whereby police 
have largely reported a general lack of proficiency in these types of 
crimes and little transparency or knowledge of methods used by upper 
management to address them (see generally, Goodman 1997; Holt 
and Bossler 2012; Holt, Bossler, and Fitzgerald 2010; McQuade 2006; 
Swire 2009; Tcherni-Buezzo et al. 2016). Little-to-nothing is known 
about the investigational capacities of local police agencies in the U.S. 
to conduct Tor-based operations or defend against darknet-
originating threats, and what is publicly known relates to federal 
indictments and news reports once an arrest or Tor site takedown has 
occurred. Given that existing studies have consistently reported a 
general lack in basic cyber-capabilities and/or low prioritizing of 
cybercrime cases in municipal police departments (see generally, 
Bossler and Holt 2012; Dolliver, Collins, and Sams 2017; Holt and 
Blevins 2011; Holt, Bossler, and Fitzgerald 2010), additional attention 
is critically needed to improve the ability of departments to, for 
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example, seize Bitcoin or Monero, investigate the origins of a 
particular strain of ransomware code, or track down batches of 
falsified documents purchased from Tor Network vendors. 
IV. STRENGTHENING CYBER CAPABILITIES OF LOCAL POLICE 
DEPARTMENTS
These challenges highlight the significant complexity that 
embodies the intersection of local police departments with threats in 
the cyber domain. Not only does the decentralized structure of 
policing and technological fragmentation hamper some agencies’ 
abilities to investigate breaches of local, state, and federal laws (see 
generally, Goodman 1997; McQuade 2006; Swire 2009), but these 
factors also limit agencies’ abilities to defend their own servers and 
networks from intrusion. In the digital age, these threats are no longer 
localized (Dolliver and Love 2015, 88); foreign adversaries can easily 
target municipal police departments’ networks and databases from 
thousands of miles away. Remote intruders may put case records 
containing evidence and the personal information of suspects and 
witnesses at risk of interception or manipulation, and in the case of 
some small police departments, may even put an entire city’s network 
at risk, just as intrusions into the larger network could put at risk the 
records of individual departments. For instance, servers of the small 
city of Leeds, Alabama were infected with ransomware in early 2018; 
this subsequently shut down operations at the police and fire 
departments, which also used the city’s server for the department’s 
day-to-day operations and case management (Collins 2018).  
 From operational and policy-driven perspectives, the primary 
challenge is to strengthen the cyber capabilities across local police 
departments within the existing decentralized model; doing so will 
effectively strengthen national cyber defensive and offensive 
capabilities. The role and importance of all local police departments 
should not be an afterthought of national cyber security strategies, as 
this level of law enforcement fundamentally forms the backbone of the 
cyber defensive capabilities of the U.S. Adaptation by local law 
enforcement to changing environments is not new; many police 
departments have progressed (albeit disproportionately) since 9/11 to 
incorporate counterterrorism units, intelligence-led policing, and 
participation in joint local, state, and federal law enforcement efforts, 
such as fusion centers and the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (Price 
2013, 17; Waxman 2008, 9). A similar structural shift is now needed 
within the cyber framework. 
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A. A Multifaceted Approach: Creating Conditions for Success
A multifaceted approach is necessary to address this primary 
challenge. First, the development of greater national leadership and 
coordination among agencies at all levels is needed beyond the 
legislation and policies currently in place (e.g., Cybersecurity 
Information Sharing Act 2015). Researchers have pointed out the 
general lack of synchronization between levels of law enforcement to 
address other pressing national matters (e.g., terrorism), even though 
local agencies are “uniquely positioned to augment federal … 
capabilities by virtue of being present in nearly every American 
community” (Riley et al. 2006, 1). Similarly, effectively addressing 
cyber threats (particularly those facilitated by the Tor Network) will 
require the strengthening of local, state, and federal partnerships, 
perhaps necessitating the creation of a new federal law enforcement 
agency focused solely on the cyber domain. Per decentralization, each 
federal agency currently has its own unique “cyber division,” which 
yields distinct and isolated databases, equipment, personnel, and 
missions. As each federal agency is self-contained, inconsistent and 
(at times) conflicting information is passed down to local and state 
agencies. These latter agencies need more effective direction and 
general guidelines and standards for securing networks and 
databases, cyber-investigative procedures and evidence preservation, 
and on digital forensic tools and certifications needed for personnel to 
investigate Tor-based threats impacting their jurisdictions (e.g., 
weapons transactions). A singular federal agency responsible for cyber 
investigations may be able to provide improved guidance and support 
to local agencies in these areas.  
 Such a federal agency may also be better poised to assist local 
agencies to address nation-wide problems of personnel recruitment 
and retention, in addition to funding cyber-related assistance 
programs (Price 2013, 40; Riley et al. 2006, 1). As general recruiting 
practices continue to yield fewer qualified applicants and the 
functions of police departments become increasingly specialized (e.g., 
Smith 2016, 4), researchers have emphasized the “compelling need” 
for the federal government to support these efforts (Riley et al. 2006, 
1). Moreover, a centralized cyber agency may be able to provide more 
widely accessible funding for local agencies to support the hiring of 
digital forensic experts, update existing technology (e.g., computers, 
servers), and better position their agencies to address criminal cyber 
cases. While some funding of this nature currently exists via funding 
sources like the National Institute of Justice, these monies are not 
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routinely available, funds are limited, and the process is extremely 
competitive. More serious consideration needs to be given to 
improving the cyber strength of as many of the 18,000 local police 
departments as feasible. 
 Second, officers in local police departments across the U.S. need to 
have a general awareness of what the Tor Network is and contains (in 
addition to other emerging technologies that utilize darknets), and 
how to preserve evidence and investigate activity on these networks. 
There is an overall lack of familiarity with many aspects of the cyber 
domain among officers (e.g., Bossler and Holt 2012, 177; Burns et al. 
2004, 479; McQuade 2006, 36, 37), but as the use of Tor and 
cryptocurrencies become more pervasive, the need for cyber-capable 
law enforcement officers becomes more acute. Otherwise, local 
investigators may fail to recognize (for instance) handwritten 
cryptocurrency seeds7 in a ledger at a crime scene, or fail to keep their 
own identities safe during online undercover investigations. Thus, 
proactive trainings in this area should be more widely available. As 
many agencies do not have adequate funding for such trainings, 
agencies may need to partner with institutions of higher learning to 
provide the training (Koper et al. 2015, 2). For example, a research 
team at the JECTF (which partners with the University of Alabama) 
provides free, hands-on trainings on Tor and Tails OS-based 
investigational methods for local, state, and federal law enforcement 
agencies (JECTF Law Enforcement Training Schedule). Without 
efforts to increase officers’ situational awareness of and capabilities to 
address attack-based, processual, and economic threats on Tor across 
departments nationwide, inherent institutional fragmentation can 
exacerbate local, state, and national vulnerabilities and can lead to 
slower responses or redundancy of efforts by law enforcement 
agencies. 
 Finally, the culture within the policing institution needs to more 
broadly accept the realities of the cyber age. The “police culture has 
been widely criticized as a source of resistance to change and reform,” 
particularly with regards to technological innovations, even though 
the threat landscape has been shifting into the digital arena for 
decades (Cohen 2017, 112; Crank 2014, 3, 4; Koper et al. 2015, 250). 
While cultural change is difficult not only for local law enforcement 
agencies, but for all organizations (Cohen 2017, 112), decreasing 
7 A seed is a random series of words that allows the individual to restore access to a wallet. 
Without this seed, officers will not be able to seize the cryptocurrency assets.  
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resistance to new technologies rests in changing the perceptions of 
officers, which are “highly dependent on the norms and culture of an 
agency and how officers view their function” (Koper et al. 2015, 20). 
Moreover, research on the relation between police and technology has 
found that officers are more likely to accept and adopt a new 
technology “if it is easy to use and [officers] can directly see how it 
helps them do their job” (Koper et al. 2015, 6). This discussion relates 
to the second point above, as more frequent and accessible Tor-based 
trainings for local law enforcement officers will ideally change the 
perception of this emerging technology by increasing officers’ 
familiarity and proficiency with this anonymous platform, therefore 
increasing the likelihood that officers find the technology 
operationally beneficial. Further, the National Computer Forensic 
Institute (NCFI)8 is an example of a federally driven effort to increase 
officer literacy in and adoption of digital forensic methods. The NCFI 
provides free training, equipment, and software licenses to local law 
enforcement officers in a broad range of digital forensic techniques, 
spanning from mobile device evidence collection and preservation to 
network intrusion detection and defense (NCFI Home Page, 2018). 
Introducing these technologies into police departments, along with 
trained personnel, will begin to normalize cyber investigations and 
digital evidence recovery from Tor-enabled (and other) devices, thus 
assisting agencies with slowly adapting to the digital age. As Cohen 
(2017, 122) stated, “changing [police] behavior is neither easy nor 
impossible.”  
V. CONCLUSION
This discussion underscores the gap between threats facilitated by 
the Tor Network that have the ability to impact national security and 
the differential capabilities of local law enforcement agencies in the 
U.S. to address and defend against those threats as first responders. 
Though it is difficult to unilaterally overcome issues of technological 
fragmentation and strengthen the cyber proficiencies of a 
decentralized system of 18,000 local police departments, this study 
proposed methods by which to improve the situational awareness and 
capabilities of these agencies to investigate Tor-based attack-based, 
processual, and economic cyber threats. In turn, this will strengthen 
the overall cyber defensive capabilities of the U.S. and enhance 
8 The NCFI is operated by the U.S. Secret Service and is located in Hoover, Alabama. 
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existing and future national security strategies. Without a strong 
foundation in the cyber domain at the local policing level, foreign and 
domestic adversaries will continue to exploit local, state, and national 
cyber vulnerabilities with little consequence.  
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